The Impact of Environmental Change on Labour Migration from Nepal to the Gulf States by Sharma, Jeevan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Environmental Change on Labour Migration from
Nepal to the Gulf States
Citation for published version:
Sharma, J 2011, The Impact of Environmental Change on Labour Migration from Nepal to the Gulf States.
Foresight, UK Government Office for Science, London.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Sharma, J. (2011). The Impact of Environmental Change on Labour Migration from Nepal to the Gulf States.
London: Foresight, UK Government Office for Science.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 1
 
 
 
Migration and Global Environmental 
Change 
 
CS10: The impact of environmental change on labour 
migration from Nepal to the Gulf States 
Jeevan R. Sharma 
Tufts University 
Medford, MA, USA 
October 2011 
This review has been commissioned as part of the UK Government’s Foresight 
Project, Migration and Global Environmental Change. The views expressed do 
not represent the policy of any Government or organisation. 
CS10 2
Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................3
4
6
8
10
11
12
 
The sending context: fragile but dynamic? ..........................................................................................  
Trend in migration and remittances ......................................................................................................  
Impact on the economy, poverty and livelihoods ................................................................................  
Future scenario .....................................................................................................................................  
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................  
References .............................................................................................................................................  
 
CS10 3
Introduction 
The Himalayan country of Nepal is often understood as a ‘place’ of fragility, in terms of both 
fragile environment and fragile livelihoods. Important work on Nepal, including Resources and 
Population by Macfarlane (1976), The Himalayan Dilemma by Ives and Messerli (1989), ‘Food 
Crisis in Nepal’ by Bohle and Adhikari (1998) and Nepal in Crisis by Blaikie and colleagues 
(2001, 2002), have suggested that there are severe environmental and livelihood crises in 
Nepal. How have these ‘crises’ shaped labour migration from Nepal to various global 
destinations, the Gulf States in particular, that have emerged as one of the lucrative 
destinations for Nepalis? Given that labour migration has historically played a key role in 
sustaining rural livelihoods in Nepal and forms an important part of the economy of the Gulf 
States, how might we foresee the impact of environmental changes, both in Nepal and the Gulf 
States, on migration from Nepal?  
At the very outset it is useful to set a few parameters for this paper. First, this paper is based 
on a brief review of secondary evidence on environmental and socioeconomic changes and 
outmigration pattern in Nepal. It is neither meant to offer original evidence nor an exhaustive 
review of evidence of environmental change and outmigration from Nepal. Second, this paper 
was specifically commissioned to look at labour migration from Nepal to the Gulf States. 
Therefore, although a very brief reference is made to wider context of migration in/from Nepal, 
the main focus of the paper is on labour migration to the Gulf States in the context of 
environmental changes in Nepal. Third, it is not the purpose of this paper to attempt a causal 
analysis between environmental change and outmigration to the Gulf States but rather to look 
at how environmental changes might relate to various drivers of outmigration from Nepal.  
There is very little empirical evidence linking environmental changes and migration in Nepal. 
Based on a review of existing literature dealing with aspects of migration, environmental 
change and social change in Nepal, this paper is an attempt to understand how environmental 
changes in Nepal is affecting drivers of outmigration from Nepal. It outlines the existing nature, 
pattern and significance of labour migration and its contribution to the livelihoods of migrants 
and their households, and how it is directly impacted not just by environmental change in the 
Himalayan country of Nepal but also by the larger global processes linked to dynamic nature of 
global capital and labour circulation, ideas associated with modernity, shrinking livelihood 
opportunities in Nepal, political interregnum, and formal and informal networks and recruitment 
agencies that sustain the migration flow. Based on available evidence, this paper looks at how 
labour migration can contribute to development and adaptation in the face of environmental 
change in Nepal. It explores ways of looking forward and thus implications for policy response.  
In the following paragraphs, this paper provides a brief overview of the environmental, social or 
economic fragility in the sending context that has shaped labour migration from Nepal and how 
migration can be seen as a dynamic response by households to manage their livelihoods amid 
fragile socioeconomic and environmental context. The next section discusses trends in 
migration and remittances with specific emphasis on the Gulf States. It shows that migration to 
the Gulf States has emerged as the most dynamic feature of Nepali economy and society and 
it is likely to remain an important destination of migration in the years to come. The following 
section, then, presents an analysis of how migration to the Gulf States may be vulnerable to 
environmental, economic and political shocks and the changing economy of the Gulf States 
and how this in turn may have an impact on Nepali migrants.  
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The sending context: fragile but dynamic? 
Like communities throughout the Himalayan region, those in Nepal are facing rapid changes in 
their environmental and political–economic contexts. Population growth, climate variation, 
various forms of modernisation, market expansion and globalisation have put tremendous 
pressure on the communities living in fragile Nepalese environments. These rapid changes 
have exposed the communities to various forms of risks and shaped their ability to respond to 
them. 
Since the 1970s there has been a growing scholarly and policy debate on the manner in which 
degradation of mountain environments led to significant declines in mountain agriculture 
production and deforestation and thereby directly affecting people’s livelihoods. Different 
scholars have argued that increasing demand for food for a growing population has put 
tremendous pressure on the available land and forest resources. Based on his in-depth 
fieldwork, from as early as 1968, in the middle hills, Macfarlane (1976) found that population 
growth resulted in significant environmental consequences in the mountains in the form of 
deforestation and soil degradation. He saw over-exploitation of mountain environments by the 
growing population as a major cause of concern, and speculated that there would be no forest 
cover left by 2000. Eric Eckholm, a New York Times science editor, wrote about the 
environmental crisis in the region in his book Losing Ground (1976), in which he linked 
population growth to deforestation and soil erosion in the Himalayan region, which are 
presumed to cause downstream flooding. In a chapter titled ‘Refugees from Shangri-La: 
deteriorating mountain environments’ Eckholm discussed the relationship between 
environmental degradation in the Himalayas with the hill-Tarai outmigration leading to potential 
crisis in the arai. Ives and Messerli (1989) labelled this environmental concern as ‘The Theory 
of Himalayan Degradation’, which has since attracted significant academic and policy response 
in the region. In line with the spirit of the argument, the Asian Development Bank predicted in 
1982 that there is a ‘distinct danger that all accessible forests, especially in the Hills, will be 
eliminated within less than 20 years’. Over-exploitation of agricultural land, deforestation and 
soil degradation by the growing population and its direct impact on food security and well-being 
of the population in the region has remained a consistent policy concern for the last five 
decades.  
The concern over deteriorating mountain environments led to policy response encouraging 
population relocation from the mountains to Tarai so as to ease the population pressure on the 
fragile highlands (Ojha, 1983; Shrestha and Conway, 1985). While the Tarai was initially 
thought to be comparatively safer from environmental pressure and a potential region for 
agricultural growth and possibly an economic engine of Nepal, it has since turned into a fragile 
place with rapid environmental, demographic and socioeconomic changes leading to regular 
floods and drought. The population in the Tarai experience floods every year during the 
monsoon season and their impact has grown in severity and regularity in the recent years 
(Moench and Dixit, 2004). 
Although the theory of Himalayan degradation has been repeatedly criticised for failing to take 
account of the accurate picture of change in the region (Ives and Messerli, 1989; Guthman, 
1997; Blaikie and Coppard, 1998), new forms of crises have emerged. Decline in agricultural 
productivity and its direct impact on survival and health remains a serious concern. Land 
productivity has stagnated despite increasing use of fertilisers, which is a clear indicator of land 
degradation and the unsustainable use of natural resources (Bhole and Adhikari, 1998). Since 
the 1990s Nepal has changed from a net exporter to a net importer of food. Declining 
agricultural production has depressed the rural economy and is showing worrying signs of 
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increased rates of malnutrition in rural households. With low levels of income and falling 
agricultural production coupled with increased reliance on the market for food, households 
must now allocate 60% of their household budgets for food alone and the poorest households 
allocate almost three-quarters of their incomes to food (WFP, 2010). In 2010, the World Food 
Programme reported that 43 of Nepal’s 75 districts faced food deficits and 23 were chronically 
food insecure (WFP, 2010). Under these conditions, survival for a large and growing portion of 
the Nepalese rural population has become a permanent livelihood crisis (Bohle and Adhikari, 
1998: 332). Similarly, a group of British social scientists who had highlighted this livelihoods 
crisis based on their original fieldwork in 1970s (Blaikie et al., 2001) went back to re-study their 
target population after 20 years and found that Nepal is still stuck in the same ‘crisis’ it was 20 
years ago. They stated, ‘the most important empirical conclusion about social change in rural 
western Nepal over 20 years is the degree of its continuity’ (Blaikie et al., 2002: 1267).  
The people in Nepal have managed livelihoods amid various forms of crises. One of the main 
responses has been migration in search of work opportunities. A study conducted by the 
Institute of Social and Economic Transition in the Hills of the Koshi basin found that there have 
been significant changes in the environment where water availability has declined over the last 
decade. Worsening water availability in the hills and mountains had affected local livelihoods 
and daily life in the villages in many ways, and temporary migration was one of the key 
responses of the households (Dixit et al., 2009). After their re-study, Blaikie et al. (2002) 
concluded that migrant remittances had played an important role in contributing to sustainable 
rural life more than their original study from the 1970s emphasised. Similarly, in a more recent 
account, reflecting on 30 years of change in the same middle hill village, Macfarlane found that 
the communities studied had responded to ecological collapse by outmigration, although he 
noted that people left behind were bearing the burden of outmigration, visible in their material 
impoverishment. It would appear that the scenario Macfarlane originally presented of ‘“no forest 
by the new millennium” depended on a simulation that had no input from the human capacity to 
take cognizance of change in environmental surroundings, and to alter practices of resources 
use so as to avoid disaster’ (Campbell, 2001: 111). What this means is that having 
acknowledged aspects of fragility that characterise the context in Nepal, we should also look at 
the ‘dynamic’ agency of people who have responded to the crisis in different ways. ‘Nepalese 
farmers are by no means passive, inflexible and ignorant victim of unsustainable development, 
they are highly active, adaptive and dynamic actors’ (Bohle and Adhikari, 1998: 330). One of 
the key responses to these ‘crises’ has been to intensify labour migration and mobility. 
Therefore, migration and mobility is not necessarily a pathology but a normal or usual part of 
people’s livelihoods (Sharma, 2008) and has potential for development and adaptation in the 
face of environmental change in fragile places.  
Based on data from a longitudinal study in Chitwan district in Nepal, Massey et al. (2010) found 
that environmental change is more strongly related to short- than long-distance mobility. They 
found that short-distance mobility is affected by perceived declines in productivity, declining 
land cover, and increasing time required to gather firewood. Long-distance mobility was 
affected by perceived decline in productivity but the effect was found to be weaker than in the 
case of short-term mobility. The authors of this study found that there is very little evidence that 
rising population density, declining vegetation or a growing scarcity of organic inputs play any 
role in promoting departures from the Chitwan Valley, and the long-distance mobility provoked 
by declining agricultural productivity is relatively weak. They argue that the deeper underlying 
causes of environmental migration are not only related to the severe environmental calamities 
but also to a more gradual deterioration of conditions and to subjective perceptions about the 
degree of deterioration. Therefore, it is not useful to conceptualise outmigration as a response 
to environmental migration but view it within the broader process of socioeconomic and 
livelihood changes. 
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Trend in migration and remittances 
Migration, both internal and external, is a part of the life experience of a very large number of 
Nepalis, and has historically been a significant feature of household livelihoods amid a fragile 
socioeconomic and environmental context (Hitchcock, 1961; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1995; Whelpton, 
2005). The first wave of migration began in the 18th and 19th centuries when the state policies 
on land and labour, and agrarian changes, forced peasants in the hills to move out of their land 
and seek their livelihoods elsewhere, both within Nepal and across the border into India 
(Regmi, 1978; Hutt, 1997). The work opportunities in tea plantations, construction and coal 
mining in adjoining Indian states attracted Nepalis to go and work as labourers. Labour 
migration of young men started systematically with the recruitment to serve in the army of the 
Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh and then in the British army in India. Although the Nepali state resisted 
the recruitment of Nepalis by the British until 1885 with the concern that returning army 
servicemen would bring revolutionary ideas into Nepal, the policy changed in 1886, allowing for 
the recruitment of Nepalis in the British Army, and this practice has continued for more than 
125 years to the present day. There has been substantial temporary labour migration from the 
hills to the plains in order to make up for the low incomes in hills areas and to cover the needs 
of local rural communities throughout the year. Such a quest for livelihoods has created 
durable exchanges across Nepal and across the border into India. The second wave of 
migration started in the mid-1980s, accelerated in the 1990s and dramatically increased in the 
mid-2000s, when Nepalis continued to migrate to work in India and began to migrate to new 
destinations, mainly the Gulf States and Malaysia. Decline in agricultural production and lack of 
economic opportunities in Nepal coupled with rapid economic growth in the Gulf States after 
the price hike of oil in 1973, opening up of labour recruitment agencies and the decentralisation 
of passport issuance in Nepal contributed to outmigration of unskilled and semi-skilled Nepalis 
to the Gulf States, where they mainly work in the construction and service sectors. Over the 
years, such flows have been sustained by both the social networks and the active presence of 
labour recruitment agencies. Migration flow from Nepal is part of a larger global process linked 
to the dynamic nature of global capital and labour circulation (Castles, 2011). The growth of 
service sector and associated construction and maintenance work, contract and casual labour 
combined with demographic changes and subsequent requirements of labour for new types of 
service industries, such as care work, in the Gulf States has led to demand for migrant labour 
from countries such as Nepal. These migrations have created new transnational links, 
connecting very distant countries, cultures and economies.  
Both men and women have been migrating from Nepal over the 200 years, although the nature 
and pattern of migration has changed over the years. In the past, women’s migration was 
largely limited to short-distance mobility and migration, mostly accompanied by their husbands 
and family members. Since the 1990s, Nepali women have begun to migrate on their own to 
international destinations, a trend which has dramatically increased albeit not without gendered 
discrimination, risks and control1.  
Recent estimates suggest that there may be as many as 3 million Nepalis, i.e. about 10% of 
the total population, working abroad including in neighbouring India (World Bank, 2011). 
Females constitute 8% of the total number of migrants. This estimate is significantly higher 
than the official statistics. The estimated population of migrants in the past can be seen in 
                                            
1 Media frequently report on the physical and sexual harassment of Nepali migrant women. In response, the Government of Nepal 
banned female migration to the Gulf States in 1998. Although the ban was lifted followed pressure from women’s activist groups and 
civil society, it has been reimposed several times for those who go to work as domestic workers in the Gulf States. 
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various censuses2. According to the national Census, the number of Nepalis temporarily 
abroad rose significantly from 402,977 in 1981 to 762,181 in 2001, although it is difficult to get 
systematic data on the migrant destination.  
Migrant remittances have played a key role in sustaining the rural economy and people’s 
livelihoods during the decade-long Maoist conflict. The official contribution of remittances to 
Nepal’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was US$2.7 billion, or 22% of the GDP. 
However, with large amounts also being sent outside the official banking system and including 
those from India, the actual contribution of remittances could be as high as 30% of Nepal’s 
GDP (World Bank, 2011). Remittance from Nepalese abroad grew at 20% a year between 
1995 and 96 and 2003 and 2004 rising from less than 3% of GDP in 1995–96 to about 12% by 
the end of 2003–04 (World Bank, 2006). This has had a phenomenal impact in the national 
economy and household livelihoods. 
Data from National Living Standard surveys show that the average level of remittances at the 
household level increased from Nepali rupees (NRs) 3,500 (8.5% of mean per capital 
expenditure) in 1995–96 to nearly NRs 6,000 (15.8% of mean consumption) in 2003–04. The 
2009 estimates suggest that a typical household receives NRs 41,000 in a year in remittances, 
which amounts to NRs 8,000 per person. A 2009 estimate suggests that for those households 
that receive remittances, they receive on average NRs 105,000 a year, which amounts to NRs 
20,000 in per capita terms (World Bank, 2011). According to Nepal Living Standard surveys, 
the share of households receiving remittances, from within and outside of Nepal, rose from 
23% in 1995–96 to 32% in 2003–04 and 55.8% in 2010.  
The most recent data for 2009–10 from the Department of Foreign Employment Promotion 
shows that Nepalis migrate to work in 105 countries globally. The Gulf States have become 
one of the key destinations since the mid-1990s and certainly also one of the most dynamic 
phenomena (Graner and Gurung, 2003). The trend over the last two decades show that 38% of 
Nepali migrants seeking work travel abroad to the Gulf States to work as contract workers, and 
are mediated by a chain of recruitment agencies. In the Gulf States, manufacturing (35%) and 
construction (21%) dominate the employment of Nepali workers. Unpublished records available 
from the Department of Labour shows that the official figure for the early 1990s was only 2,000, 
which increased to 6,500 in 1997–98 and 20,000 by 1999–2000. In 1997, Seddon et al. (2001) 
suggested that about 40,000 migrant workers from Nepal went to the Gulf States. Official 
statistics suggests that this number increased to 1,045,655 by 2009–10. This clearly suggests 
the growing popularity of migration to the Gulf States from Nepal. The latest official data show 
that Qatar (28.71%), Saudi Arabia (19.81%) and the United Arab Emirates (12.68%) account 
for popular destinations in the Gulf States (Nepal Government, 2010). 
Despite the unofficial restrictions on working in the Gulf States, female migration has been 
increasingly significantly over the last several years. Official statistics recorded that, compared 
with only 316 female migrants in 2007, in 2008 a total of 11,007 migrated to 41 countries, 
suggesting a sharp rise, most likely due to the uplifting of the ban, in September 2007, to enter 
Gulf countries. Women who migrate to the Gulf States mainly work as care workers, and their 
demand has increased significantly over the years. Findings from the Nepal Migration Survey 
(World Bank, 2011) show that, compared with non-migrants, migrant population to the Gulf is 
predominantly male, i.e. only 6.3% of migrants to the Gulf are female.  
                                            
2 Censuses tend to underestimate migrant stocks abroad because they do not account for seasonal/temporary migration accurately. 
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Looking at the place of origin, data from the Nepali Migration Survey (2009) show that the 
proportion of migrants to the Gulf States is high from rural areas (91.6%), eastern (41.8%) and 
western (26.5%) regions, and Tarai (59.1%). These areas send more migrants to the Gulf 
compared with the proportion of their population. 
Gulf destinations remain the most important source of remittance for Nepal. Findings from the 
Nepal Migration Survey suggest that of the US$2.5 billion of remittances from abroad (including 
from India), about half comes from the Gulf countries (US$1.2 billion). This clearly shows that 
the remittances from the Gulf States, which is 48.9% of the total remittance, has a significant 
role in the economy of Nepal. On average, households with a migrant in the Gulf States receive 
US$2,120, whereas the figure is US$800 for those who receive from India and US$4,050 for 
those who receive from developed countries. On average, the monthly salary of a migrant in 
the Gulf is about US$230 per month. The average cost of migration to work in the Gulf States 
is about US$1,430. This amount is about six times their monthly income and about 10 times 
their monthly savings. Migration is financed by savings, loans and by selling land, and about 
one-third of migrants use their own finances. Remittance behaviour of Nepali migrants in the 
Gulf shows that they tend to send their remittances using money transfer companies.  
The excessive dependence on foreign remittance has its drawbacks. While there is very little 
evidence that the global financial crisis had a significant impact on migration flow or inward 
remittances, they did slow down during the recession period. The flow of Nepali migrant 
workers declined by 13% during the recession period. The official statistics show that 217,164 
individuals left the country for employment in the year 2008–09 compared with 249,051 in 
2007–08. Although the decline was not significant, it did indicate the nature of vulnerability 
associated with global economic downturn. A study commissioned by the BBC found that ‘the 
picture in the Gulf States, which has been heavily reliant on contract labour migration, is a 
mixed one – in part because the Gulf economies have experienced the recession very 
differently’ (Fix et al., 2009: 7). This study noted that the migration flows from Nepal to Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates fell and those to Saudi Arabia increased, reflecting the economic 
strength of the destination countries. The data from the Department of Foreign Employment 
Promotion reveal that the number of migrant workers leaving for the United Arab Emirates 
declined from 45,342 to 31,688 between 2007 and 08 and 2008 and 09. Qatar accepted 31% 
fewer migrants from Nepal (declining from 51,000 to 35,000). However, Nepali migrants leaving 
for Saudi Arabia, a country where public investments remain strong despite the drop in price for 
oil, increased by 15% to 48,749 during the most recent fiscal year, up from 42,394 in 2007–08. 
Sharma and Gurung (2009) indicate that there are three reasons why the number of Nepali 
migrants recently declined in the Gulf States. First, there has been a slowdown in the 
construction work that employed unskilled Nepali workers; second, many investors deferred 
construction work in the view of the economic slowdown; and third, many companies 
introduced heavy cuts in hiring labourers.  
Impact on the economy, poverty and 
livelihoods 
International migration has become the most important economic activity in Nepal and 
remittances from the Gulf States form a key part in it. A recent study shows that 40% of migrant 
recipient households in Nepal are totally dependent on remittances and half of international 
remittances come from the Gulf States (World Bank, 2011). Such pervasiveness of migration 
challenges the notion that Nepal is a traditional and agrarian society. The nature of the 
households have transformed into multi-locale households with the outmigration of a large 
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number of men and an increasing number of women to various destinations. Remittance flow 
has further boosted the incorporation of Nepal into the global economy, as confirmed by the 
immediate opening of Western Union outlets in even the remotest areas, as soon as the road 
and telecommunications network reaches there.  
The economic scale and impact of migration appears far more significant than the flow of 
foreign aid. Evidence suggests that migration contributed significantly to poverty reduction in 
Nepal. The World Bank reports that socioeconomic progress, or ‘escape from poverty’ between 
2000 and 2009 was almost twice as fast for households with migrants than those without. The 
11% decline in poverty incidence in Nepal between 1996 and 2004 was explained as due to 
remittances. Analysis by Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics concluded that poverty would 
have declined by 5% instead of 11% if remittances had remained unchanged between the two 
surveys.  
Based on an analysis of the Nepal Living Standard Surveys of 1996 (NLSS-I) and 2004 (NLSS-
II), Lokshin et al. (2010) found that one-fifth of the poverty reduction in Nepal occurring 
between 1995 and 2004 can be attributed to higher levels of work-related migration and 
remittances sent home. Lokshin et al. (2010) concluded, ‘in the absence of migration, the 
poverty rate would increase from the currently observed 30 per cent to 33.6 per cent, and the 
mean per capita expenditure would decline from NRs 15,000 to 14,000’. The results from the 
Nepal Living Standard Survey III (2010) show that there was an 18% decline in poverty 
between 2003 and 2010. All these studies help illuminate the relationship between remittances 
and poverty reduction, although they say nothing about whether remittances have contributed 
to reducing socioeconomic inequalities.  
Outmigration has played an important role in securing rural livelihoods. It has remained a key 
response of households amid declining agriculture and livelihood insecurities. Outmigration has 
not only put less pressure on land and natural resources, but also migrant remittances have 
been particularly useful to meet subsistence, consumption and other daily needs of household 
members. Cash income from remittances plays an important role in meeting household 
expenses. Remittances have allowed households to continue with their farming, in particular to 
pay for the labour, fertilisers, seeds and other related expenses. The flow of remittances has 
created labouring opportunities for the poorer households that are unable to send their 
members abroad. The shortage of labour due to the high rate of outmigration has meant that 
the cost of hiring labour has increased, directly benefiting the labourers who are otherwise 
unable to outmigrate. Also, there are more opportunities for renting land. As migration and 
remittance exchange gets embedded in the rural economy and culture, it has become an 
important part of household livelihoods.  
Both the practice and ideas of migration to the Gulf States has become so pervasive that it 
might be useful to see it as a rule rather than as an exception (Sharma, 2008). It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the culture of migration has become so embedded in Nepali society 
that it has become a rite of passage especially among young men and women. It has also 
become a matter of prestige and status for the households. Migrants do not just transform their 
economic investment in migration and labour power into remittances, they are also important 
actors of cultural change. Although economic gains are often highlighted as the impact of 
migration and one of the reasons why people migrate, experiencing the wider world of 
consumption and ideas of modernity are often the main reasons why young adults migrate and 
what they bring back with them. This is self-evident when we look at the returnee migrants. 
Whether it is a tape-recorder brought by a far-west migrant from Mumbai, a flat-screen 
television brought by a Gulf returnee, a sophisticated mobile phone brought by a skilled migrant 
from the UK or gold ornaments brought by Nepali women workers working in Kuwait and Saudi 
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Arabia, they all show that migrants are not just workers but also consumers. Learning new 
languages and skills, forming new social networks and gaining understanding of the wider 
world are all a part of migration experience.  
Migration is considered by young men, and a growing number of women, simply as a thing to 
do. A large number of educated unemployed in Nepal do not want to be viewed as ‘faltu’ 
(useless), and migration offers an opportunity for them to escape the category of ‘faltu’ 
(Sharma, 2008). This probably explains why an ever increasing number of men and women 
continue to travel to work in often exploitative and difficult situations in different countries, often 
with very little economic return to their investment. Thus, while migration to the Gulf States may 
not always make sense in terms of significant economic returns, it certainly makes sense in 
terms of broader conception of household livelihoods and young men and women’s identities.  
Future scenario 
The Gulf States are the third-largest destination region in the world for migrants after North 
America and Europe. The scale of foreign labour migration into the Gulf States is a recent 
phenomenon and was estimated to be between 800,000 and 1.25 million in the early 1970s. 
The number increased to 4.4 million by 1985. Despite the attempt by the Gulf States to 
discourage foreign labour and encourage national workers, the number of foreign labourers 
increased sharply to 7.1 million by 1999 (which represented almost 70% of the workforce in the 
Gulf States) and 10.6 million by 2008. The steady increase in the number of foreign labourers, 
mainly from South Asia, in these countries is a result of a combination of liberal labour 
immigration policies and lax enforcement of labour regulations that allows private sector 
employers freedom to determine salaries and employment conditions and offer cheaper salary 
to foreign workers much below the average salary of national employees (Winckler, 2010).  
The increasing number of foreign workers has raised popular concerns among citizens in the 
Gulf States on its impact on politics, culture and the economy. It is very likely that the Gulf 
States will, in the future, adopt control measures to restrict and close down immigration routes. 
However, the Gulf States are likely to face a major tension between the political need to control 
immigration and economic necessity to bring foreign labour. Such tension may lead to an 
increase in illegal and undocumented immigration, causing significant trouble to the migrant 
workers. Paradoxically, the policies on possible restriction on foreign labour are unlikely to be 
effective given the rentier relationship between the rulers and the merchant elite in the Gulf 
States (Winckler, 2010). Such a process of restriction on the use of foreign labour will 
eventually affect Nepali workers, but Nepalis are likely to be the last group to be affected by 
such policies because they are one of the cheapest labourers in the labour market and are less 
known for demanding rights unlike their Indian or Bangladeshi counterparts.  
The rapid economic growth in neighbouring India and China may open up increased and 
attractive employment opportunities for Nepali migrants to these countries, although it is likely 
to depend primarily on the labour availability in these countries. Although Nepal shares an 
open border with India and has historically supplied Nepali labourers to the police, army, 
agriculture and service sectors, contributing to the growth of the Indian economy, the recent 
debates on the regulation of the open border and increased securitisation of the border could 
make it relatively difficult for Nepalis to travel to work in India. On the other hand, although 
Nepal does not share an open border with China, one could speculate that the ongoing 
construction of roads through the Himalayan border may facilitate increased population mobility 
between these two countries.  
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Overall, despite probable control measures to restrict immigration of foreign workers from 
South Asia, the demand for Nepali labour migration to the Gulf and other countries is likely to 
increase because of the booming construction, maintenance and service sector in the region. 
Qatar, host of the 2022 football World Cup, is likely to attract a large number of Nepali 
migrants, initially in the construction sector and later in the service sector. The attraction of 
employment in the Gulf States, despite some serious drawbacks, is likely to remain as strong 
as ever not only because of Nepalis’ socioeconomic and environmental fragility, coupled with 
political instability, but also because migration to the Gulf States offers an opportunity for 
unemployed young adults to prove their ‘worth’.  
Looking at the current trend, young adults from Nepal will continue to aspire to migration to the 
Gulf States. As the number of educated unemployed increases, they are likely to see migration 
to the Gulf States as a usual livelihood strategy in search of economic security and ‘worth’. This 
would mean that there is likely to be an increased number of multi-locale households in Nepal, 
and remittances will continue to shape the political economy of Nepal. With its inability to 
create job opportunities, the Nepali state will continue to encourage migration of young adults 
to the Gulf States as long as such opportunities exist in those countries. As the entire economy 
gets overshadowed by remittances, associated commodification and market penetration in 
everyday consumption, it is the poorer households that are unable to send migrants who will 
face increased risk of marginalisation and destitution, as highlighted by Macfarlane (2001).  
Not only will remittances from the Gulf States continue to be an important aspect of Nepali 
economy, but also various service sectors including banks, remittance transfer companies, 
labour recruitment agencies, telecommunication companies, real estate, construction and 
airlines among others are likely to grow further with important implications for Nepal’s 
economy. Because successful migrants and their households favour investment in real estate 
in market areas, land values are likely continue to rise sharply in small towns, cities and 
markets, and the construction industry will boom significantly. This will be evident by the 
expansion of markets in rural areas, in particular of hardware shops in roadside bazaars, and 
significant consumption of cement, concrete, brick and iron rods among others. We can 
anticipate that the inflow of remittances will significantly increase the relocation of households 
from rural areas to nearby cities and town, and such a trend is already visible. Such relocation 
from rural to urban areas is likely to ease pressure on agriculture and environment in rural 
areas but will also put increased pressure on resources in urban centres, towns and peri-urban 
areas. Rural economies will become more integrated with the urban market, significantly 
changing the characteristics of rural Nepal and households.  
Conclusion 
Amid the degradation of mountain environment, declining agricultural production and 
socioeconomic changes in Nepal, outmigration is on the rise. As Massey et al. (2010) argue, 
environment is only one of the factors that influence long-distance mobility and it is by no 
means the most important.  
It is not immediately clear if the economic growth in India and China will necessarily translate 
into increased labouring opportunities for Nepalis in these countries. As long as Nepal and 
India share open borders, Nepalis will continue to migrate to India, although the current 
declining trend of migration to India may reverse should there be restriction in work 
opportunities in the Gulf States. Outmigration is probably one key option that is likely to be 
available to the households and the growing number of unemployed youth.  
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Based on the available evidence, this paper suggests that labour migration must be 
understood, both analytically and empirically, in the context of rapid livelihood and 
environmental change. Viewing Nepali migrants not merely as ‘reactors’ of large-scale 
livelihood insecurities brought by various factors including environmental changes and 
associated changes in agrarian and other forms of livelihoods but also as active ‘actors’ who 
mobilise their livelihood strategies to cope with risks associated with it allows a much more 
dynamic understanding of the impact of environmental change on labour migration from Nepal, 
and this has obvious implications for policy response.  
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